ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II authorizes an investigation into the situation in Kenya
On 31 March 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court (ICC) held by majority decision that the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) may commence an investigation proprio motu for crimes against humanity allegedly committed in the Republic of Kenya in relation to the post-election violence of 2007 – 2008. Ratione temporis, the OTP may now investigate crimes from 1 June 2005 (the date of the Rome Statute’s entry into force for the Republic of Kenya) to 26 November 2009 (the date of the filing of the Prosecutor’s Request to allow the investigation).
The Decision, which can be accessed at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc854562.pdf, has great political and legal implications, as it represents the ICC’s first major ruling showcasing its understanding of the legal elements of crimes against humanity as stipulated in Article 7 of the ICC Statute. ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo opened the OTP Press Conference on 1 April 2010 by reiterating the Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber, stating “The judges decided. There will be justice in Kenya.” Ocampo stressed that the OTP will conduct the investigations with fairness and impartibility, and with respect for every party in the proceedings, holding “I will engage in this process with the Kenyans, with all the communities. This Court is their Court. Kenyan leaders – women, youth, tribal, judicial, political, religious, all have a role to play. I want to understand them and analyze how my office and all Kenyans can work together to prevent of future violence.” Ocampo’s eagerness to highlight the process was possibly due to the trouble the OTP faced in the Lubanga and Katanga/Chui trials regarding compliance with the law on disclosure – particularly Article 54(3)(e) of the ICC Statute.
From a legal perspective, the Decision touched on some of the very foundations of the law governing the ICC. The majority found that in accordance with the purpose of the ICC Statute, the general threshold for authorizing an investigation are to be seen as rather low, claiming that, at this stage of the proceedings, the OTP may present to the Chamber any information that may lead to the result when there is a reasonable basis to believe that crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC had been committed. The Chamber held that the wording ‘reasonable basis to proceed’, included verbatim in Articles 15 and 53 of the ICC Statute, concerned with the role of the Prosecutor and the initiation of an investigation, respectively, displays the same harmonized standard.
As for the interpretation of the legal elements of crimes against humanity, the Court interpreted the contextual element of ‘attack’, which, pursuant to Article 7(2)(a) of the ICC Statute, includes ‘a State or organizational policy’, progressively. The Court held that not only state, or de facto state policy, but also a non – state policy may be sufficient. Not the formal nature and the level of the ‘organization’ should be decisive to form the required policy, but the level of infringement of basic human rights.
ICC Judge Hans Peter Kaul disagreed in a comprehensive and well-written dissenting opinion comprising of no less than 80 pages. Regarding the standard for opening an investigation, and while agreeing with the majority on the general standard of ‘reasonable basis to proceed’, Kaul stressed that some caution should be exercised as to what sort and quality of information may satisfy this standard. Kaul claimed that contrary to national prosecutions, the OTP should not be allowed to present simply any sort of information, but rather only information that is adequately reliable and credible, because opening proceedings at the ICC may lead to serious multilateral implications. Furthermore, the ICC only concerns itself with the gravest international crimes of universal concern. Thus, the well known national standard of ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ should be handled more strictly in ICC proceedings. In the case at hand, Kaul concluded that the OTP had not presented adequate material particularly with regard to the contextual element of ‘attack’.
Concerning substantive criminal law, Kaul claimed that great caution should be exercised to transplant case law from international and internationalized tribunals – such as the ICTR, ICTY and SCSL – to ICC law for purposes of legal interpretation. Simply, the ICC Statute does not mandate that the ICC follow precedents of other Courts. Finally, and by relying on the legal and factual history of crimes against humanity, Kaul made a case for interpreting the term ‘organization’ conservatively as to only include State and state-like entities. Without a stricter interpretation, Kaul believed that the concept of crimes against humanity may expand to ‘any infringement to human rights’, blurring the lines between human rights law and international criminal law. Even though I don’t espouse Kaul’s perspective on this issue, I consider his view reasonable and comprehensible. What limits me from embracing his opinions is the fact that acts of ‘ad hoc macro-criminality’, such as the drop of an atomic bomb, the poisoning of a city’s water supply system, or an intentional plane crash into a skyscraper might possibly not be included when applying Kaul’s interpretation, yet they should qualify as crimes against humanity due to comparable quantity and quality of damage caused (elaborated upon elsewhere, see B. Kuschnik, Der Gesamttatbestand des Verbrechens gegen die Menschlichkeit, 235 et seq).
Since the majority of ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II refused to concur with Kaul’s conservative interpretation on the term ‘organization’, the ICC will be free to possibly handle such scenarios under its jurisdiction in the future.